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[Reproduced below are excerpts from an article titled, "A Brief Look at the March 1988 Elections in
El Salvador," by El Rescate, a non-profit data collection and solidarity organization headquartered
in Los Angeles. The article was released for distribution to the Central America Resource Network
(Palo Alto, Calif.) on April 4.] The Context of the Elections The results of the March 20 elections
in El Salvador must be viewed within the context of severe repression and intimidation of the
population by conservative forces, military and para-military. This repression has had the effect
of reducing the political field to candidates from the center-right and ultra-right. Since the signing
of the Esquipulas II Agreement on August 7, 1987, the human rights situation "has deteriorated
quantitively and qualitatively at an alarming rate," according to the non-governmental Human
Rights Commission of El Salvador (CDHES). An understanding of the causes of this deterioration
helps to view the elections as the result of a process of increasing strength within the hardline
factions of the military, as well as hardline political parties, rather than an abrupt and unexpected
shift to the right beginning on March 20. The peace plan signed by President Jose Napoleon
Duarte represented compromises which the most conservative military and political forces found
unacceptable. In addition to obligating the government to negotiate with the military arm of the
guerrillas (FMLN), the plan also allowed the return of exiled opposition political leaders and
declared an amnesty for all political prisoners. Furthermore, Salvadoran refugees in Honduras were
permitted to return to their homes in or near areas of conflict, areas which the military purposefully
drained of populations in order to reduce support for the guerrillas. These developments were,
and still are, viewed as disastrous by the right, which has no intention of settling for anything less
than a total military defeat of the guerrillas. Pressure from these conservative forces made itself felt
immediately following the signing of the peace plan: the amnesty requirement for political prisoners
was extended to include all military men accused (but never formally charged or even encarcerated)
of killing civilians, as well as death squad members who alone accounted for thousands of civilian
deaths in recent years. It is now prohibited, by law, to prosecute any of these men, sending a clear
message that violence and murder are viable instruments in dealing with the opposition. Thus,
it is difficult to regard as coincidence the timing of the assassination of Herbert Anaya, CDHES
president, on October 26 last year. Although reprehensible, Anaya's murder is but one of a long
list of human rights abuses since Esquipulas II. Instances of torture and death-squad type killings
have increased significantly since October, including such brutal tactics of intimidation as using
acid to disfigure victims, cutting off sexual organs and displaying mutilated bodies in public places.
On three separate occasions, prisoners in official custody have died and the government has failed
to investigate or charge anyone with the crimes. Just recently, in an attack on organized labor,
union leader Humberto Centeno was beaten and tortured, and had to be hospitalized. It is in this
environment of violence and fear that the elections took place. Conspicuously absent from the
elections were any parties left of Duarte's Christian Democrat Party (PDC). The current level of
violence, combined with expectations of fraud (in three separate elections in the 1970s, widespread
fraud and manipulation by the military denied gains made by parties on the left), forced all parties
left of the PDC to boycott the March 20 elections. Leaders of the Democratic Revolutionary Front's
(FDR) member parties feared that persons known to have campaigned for them or to have voted
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for their party or parties, especially in rural areas, would be targeted for violence. They added that
elections within a context that does not provide democratic guarantees to voters can offer no hope
of real change or reform for El Salvador. Consequently, the election came down to a two-party race
between the PDC and ARENA. Why did ARENA Win? The results of the elections, specifically
the resounding defeat of the PDC, reflected a broad-based popular discontent with the current
government that coincided with mounting frustration on the right. There is little doubt that the USsupported PDC clearly emerged as the loser in the elections because of its failure to rejuvenate the
economy (half the population is un- or underemployed, inflation remains high, and the majority
of Salvadorans have suffered a devastating deterioration in living conditions during the Duarte
administration despite the massive infusion of US aid) and because of the widespread perception
that corruption is rampant within the PDC. Its inability to end the war also hurt Duarte's party,
especially in the countryside. The rejection of the PDC can also be interpreted as a rejection of the
Reagan administration's policy in El Salvador which has placed all of its support behind the PDC
as the best hope for "true democracy." The success of ARENA in courting voters is thus largely
due to a lack of alternatives: voters wanted to punish the PDC and ARENA represented the only
other major political party which mounted a well-organized and highly visible campaign. Though
known for its ties to death-squad activity and political violence, ARENA has been trying to clean up
its image, while the PDC has begun to share the blame for human rights abuses. Most important,
the level of voter abstention was very high, a key fact often overlooked in analyses of the elections.
Of a population of slightly more than 5 million, 1.6 million voters were registered for the election
and only 1 million voted, roughly 40% of the voting age population... Voter absenteeism is very
significant, since the pressure to vote remains intense in El Salvador. Without a voter's registration
card, individuals could be easily targeted for political violence as subversives and have trouble with
employers. The Future The election results will have an impact on the lives of Salvadorans and will
undoubtedly create serious contradictions for proponents of current US policy. ARENA stands in
a very good position for the March 1989 presidential elections, especially now that their candidate,
Alfredo Cristiani, seems to be increasingly acceptable to the United States. ARENA, which now
controls the judicial and legislative branches, could control the executive branch as well, giving it
thorough dominion over the country. By winning the March 20 elections, ARENA will already be
in a position to appoint a new Supreme Court, which in turn will appoint judges to lower courts.
Meanwhile, the PDC is likely to become increasingly divided as its two presidential candidates,
Rey Prendes and Fidel Chavez Mena, continue their bitter struggle to win the party's nomination.
It thus seems that political polarization and disunity will increase, as the most repressive forces in
the country, represented by ARENA, consolidate their grip on the political machinery. It is also very
likely that ARENA leader Roberto D'Aubuisson, once described by an American ex-Ambassador
as a "pathological killer," will be able to resist impeachment and prosecution for his role in the
assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero in 1980. Since the Assembly is the body which would
have to initiate such actions, no one expects justice since ARENA now controls the majority vote.
Moreover, intolerance of the opposition, political violence and drastic solutions to end the war can
be expected. It is possible that the population will become more radicalized as peaceful means of
opposition are closed off and violence seems to be the only alternative.
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